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NOTES AND COMMENTS

from another state. Furthermore, on numerous occasions when the
actual operations test has been applied, the courts have pointed out
that their acceptance of the actual operations test is not a rejection
of the applicability of the nerve center test under appropriate circumstances-when the activities of the corporation are scattered
among many states.3" Thus considering the manner in which the
courts have applied the bankruptcy tests so far, it is arguable that
when the corporation is concentrated in one state, the actual operations test will be applied, but in cases in which the corporate assets
are dispersed among many states, the home office or nerve center
test will be invoked.
It is still too soon, however, to ascertain whether this preliminary test will continue to be utilized to determine which of the
bankruptcy tests will be applied. It is hoped that through continual
development of this preliminary test, some degree of certainty will
be introduced into the method of determining a corporation's principal place of business.
GLEN B. HARDYMON
Federal Jurisdiction-Political Question-Non-Justiciability of State
Reapportionments
In a recent decision,' the United States Supreme Court once
again declined to consider a voting right case under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In this case, however,
the Court invoked its jurisdiction under the fifteenth amendment.
The petitioners, all Negroes, alleged that an act of the Alabama legislature2 was a device to disenfranchise Negro citizens in the Tuskegee, Alabama municipal elections and that enforcement of this act
would deny to them their rights guaranteed under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and their right to vote
under the fifteenth amendment. 3 The district court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the question presented
was of a political nature and thus not justiciable. This was affirmed
by the court of appeals, but the Supreme Court reversed.
" E.g., Gilardi v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 189 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill.
1960) ; Webster v. Wilke, supra note 38.
1 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
'Ala. Acts 1957, No. 140.
8 The petitioners alleged that the act changed the originally square shaped
municipal boundary into a twenty-eight sided figure that was designed to
and in fact did, eliminate all but three or four of the Negro voters from the
town.
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At first glance, this case would seem to be a direct reversal of a
long standing rule, i.e., federal courts have generally refused to
consider cases involving gerrymandering. 4 Such cases have been
held non-justiciable because they involve "political questions"-questions for determination by the legislature rather than the judiciary.
The instant case is not actually a reversal, however, although it may
represent a trend in the direction of enlarging the area considered
justiciable. To perceive this clearly it is necessary to examine the
language used by the Court in rendering its decision.
The Court supported its decision by saying that since the state's
legislative power had been subjugated to the constitutional protection
of the obligation of contracts, 5 it would seem that the federal constitution would also override the state's legislative power when its
action conflicted with the provisions of the fifteenth amendment.
This case was distinguished from other "political question" cases,
however, on the grounds that the act in question was enacted clearly
against the Negroes alone, and that it was the removal of an entire
voting right.6 Its applicability as judicial precedent, therefore, seems
to be severely limited.
"South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946); Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Perry
v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956); Remmy v. Smith, 102 F.
Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951). But see Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355
(1932), where redistricting acts were held invalid and mandamus issued
ordering that the redistricting acts be disregarded and that the representatives be elected at large. See generally Notes, 29 N.C.L. REV. 72 (1950);
62 HARV. L. REv. 659 (1949). See also OHIO CONST. art. 11, §§ 1-11, which
provides that reapportionment shall be made every ten years by a board
composed of the Governor, Auditor of State and Secretary of State, thus
giving the board no discretion. In State ex rel. Herbert v. Bricker, 139
Ohio St. 499, 41 N.E.2d 377 (1942), mandamus was issued compelling the
board to reapportion as directed. See also Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220
(Hawaii 1956), which was distinguished on the grounds that it involved
the Hawaii Organic Act.
Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906); Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167
U.S. 646 (1894); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Mt. Pleasant v.
Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U.S. 266
(1876).
' In Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), the Court held that if a person
was denied the right to vote on the grounds of racial discrimination he had
a cause of action for damages. This action was based on the fifteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act, Rv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1958). It must be noted that no mention was made here of an equitable
remedy as was granted in the principal case. The general rule is that equitable remedies will be granted when there is no adequate remedy available at
law.

See McCLINTOCK, EQUITY §60 (1948).

It would seem that the

dimunition of a vote would be far more susceptible to an equitable remedy
than a legal redress.
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In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Whitaker, supported by
Justices Stewart and Douglas, stated that the decision should have
been based on the fourteenth amendment. He contended that the
Court had warped the clear meaning of the fifteenth amendment,
which was intended simply to protect minorities from being denied
the right to vote. In this case, he stated, there had been no denial
of the right to vote. What had been denied was equal protection
under the law which was protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Despite the limitation which seems to have been placed on this
case by the majority, it takes on further meaning when considering
its possible applications in future cases of unfair or unequal election
districts. To appreciate the full ramifications, it is necessary to
consider the historical background of the "political question" cases.
The first mention of the doctrine of a "political question" is
found in the very early Supreme Court case of Luther v. Borden.'
There it was held that for the Court to decide which of two governments was in force in the state of Rhode Island at a particular time,
would result in the Court's entering into a matter solely within the
domain of the legislative and executive branches of the government.
This was held notwithstanding one of the governments in question
was republican in form and the other was not, and even though the
United States Constitution provided that a republican form of
government was guaranteed to the people of the United States.8
Another strong pronouncement of this policy is found in Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon.9 In this instance the Court refused to rule on the manner in which a tax statute, which was extremely burdensome to the petitioner, was enacted, implying that the
Court had no power to question the sovereign will of the people.' 0
The theory intrinsic in the doctrine of the non-justiciable political
questions is necessarily intertwined with the doctrine of "separation
of powers." If the courts were to assume jurisdiction over matters
'48
U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
'U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4: "The United States shall guarantee to every
state in this union a republican form of government ..
'223 U.S. 118 (1912).
"Id. at 123. The petitioner attacked the statute on the ground that it
was passed by a state government that was not republican in form, i.e., that
the actions of initiative and referendum violated the constitutional guarantee
of a republican government as set out in U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. The Court
held that where it is alleged that an act of a state legislature deprives a
person of property, not because it deprives him of due process of law, but
because the government is not republican in form, the question is one of a
purely political nature.
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solely within the policy-making power of the legislature, they would
be removing from the citizens their right to self-government through
elected representatives. The courts, however, do possess the power,
through judicial review, to examine legislative acts and determine
whether they violate any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to
the citizens."
Standing alone, the fact that a state allows an unfair or unequally
proportioned electoral system to exist would be beyond the bounds
of judicial review.12 In most of the states, however, there is a constitutional provision directing the periodic reapportionment of electoral districts."3 Thus, despite the requirement of periodic reapportionment of election districts, the refusal of the courts to take
judicial cognizance of the inaction of a state legislature after an
initial apportionment results in a situation in which some people have
greater voting power than others and the people possessing the lesser
voting power not being given an equal opportunity to participate in
self-government. In contrast, the courts have not failed to act in
cases where the power of a state legislature has been actively used
to produce an inequality in voting matters.' 4
Colegrove v. Green,'5 MacDougall v. Green,'" and South v.
Peters" are three cases which have been strongly relied upon by the
courts in classifying reapportionment as a non-justiciable matter.'
For this reason a brief summary of the facts and holdings in these
cases is merited.
In Colegrove, the petitioners were asking that the officers of the
state of Illinois be restrained from arranging for an election in which
members of Congress were to be chosen pursuant to provisions of an
Illinois law of 1901 governing congressional districts. They alleged
11 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923); United States v.
Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
12 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1
(1932); Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Perry v.

Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1951).
" E.g., N.C. CONST. art. 2, §§ 4-5; S.C. CONST. art. 3, §§ 3-4; VA.

CoNsT.

art. 4, § 43.
1" Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375
(1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
18335 U.S. 281 (1948).
17339 U.S. 276 (1950).
"See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Radford v. Gary,

145 F. Supp. 541, 544 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp.
874, 876 (N.D. Ala. 1951) ; Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708, 710 (E.D.
Pa. 1951).
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that this was in conflict with the federal constitution and Illinois
state law. In this case only seven Justices were sitting. Three
called the matter non-justiciable because it was a political question.
Three Justices were in favor of granting the petitioners' request for
redistricting. In casting his tie-breaking vote, Mr. Justice Rutledge
implied that he sided with the petitioners on the basic issue but
thought that equitable discretion demanded leaving the problem to
the legislature.-9
In MacDougall, the petitioners were protesting a state law requiring a person who wanted to get his name on the ballot for state
office to get a minimum number of signatures on his petition for
nomination from a majority of the election districts. This was required even though eighty-seven per cent of the population was in
less than half of the districts. Without discussing jurisdiction, the
Court expressly decided the case on the merits for the defendants.2"
In the South case the complaint was directed against the Georgia
unit system which gives the residents of Fulton County an absurdly
small voting power. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the action,
stating that the "federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their
equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's
geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political

subdivisions. "21
The Colegrove case should be inapposite as a precedent for
classifying reapportionment as a non-justiciable matter since only
three members of the Court felt that it presented a political question.
Mr. Justice Rutledge's tie-breaking vote was not an endorsement of
the opinion that a political question was presented; rather he voted
for dismissal on the ground of equitable discretion and implied that
a justiciable issue was presented. Moreover, the Court in MacDougall apparently ignored the jurisdictional question and rendered
a decision on the merits of the case. As to the South case, Georgia
has no provision calling for legislative action in relation to reapportionment.22 Since the Constitution gives each state the power
20328 U.S. at 564 (1946).
20335 U.S. at 285 (1948).
21339 U.S. at 277 (1950).
22
The Georgia unit system provides that after each census the original
apportionment shall be automatically changed to give the six counties having
the largest population three representatives each; the twenty-six counties
having the next largest population two representatives each; and the rest
of the counties one representative each. The result of this system is that
a county with 5,000 people has one representative and a county with 100,000
people has only three representatives.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

to desigfi its electoral system, there is no way to compare the Georgia
situation with -that which. exists in the majority of states. It must
be remembered-that the courts have no power to make a law for a
state in this area, but merely to see that the action of the law in
practice does not deny individuals constitutionally guaranteed
rights.23
It is submitted that the dissents of Justices Black in the Colegrove case, Douglas in the South case and Whitaker in the principal
case are the better view. Mr. Justice Black stated that the condition
which gave rise to the Colegrove case, i.e., the refusal of the legislature to redistrict in the face of a mandate to do so, promoted a
wholly indefensible discrimination against the petitioners in that case
and all other voters in densely populated areas of that state.24 Mr.
Justice Douglas stated that the condition giving rise to the South
case was a clear reduction of the right of a selective group of citizens
to vote equally with the remainder of the electorate.2 It is further
submitted that the following line of cases supports the view of the
dissenters.
In Strauder v. West Virginia" the question presented was
whether Negroes could be systematically excluded from juries in
the courts of that state. The Supreme Court held that a state was
not required to give any rights to its citizens under the Constitution
but that once a right was given, all citizens were to be given that
right equally unless it could be removed from individuals for adequate reasons. It would seem that the voting power which is unconditionally guaranteed should be protected in the same manner.
In Nixon v. Herndon2 7 the right to vote in a primary was held to
come under protection of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In United States v. Saylor active dilution of a
citizen's vote was held to be a federal crime. In other words, one
cannot stand by a ballot box and put in a vote for X every time
somebody votes for Y. In an area where the voting districts are
unfairly drawn, the same end is reached by giving a district of
100,000 the same number of electoral votes as a district of 10,000.
" See generally Comment, Reapportionment: Is it Really A Political
Question?, 17 LA. L. REV. 593 (1956).
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 569 (1946) (dissent).
" South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (dissent).
28 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
27273 U.S. 536 (1927).
28322 U.S. 385 (1944).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter has condemned "sophisticated as well as
simple-minded modes of discrimination." 29
In United States v. Mosely8 ° and United States v. Classic8 ' it
was held that the right to vote included the right to have the ballot
counted. It would seem to be a logical extension of this to say that
that protection should also cover the right to have one vote counted
as much as the next. The Court has said that the fourteenth amendment "merely requires that all persons subjected to [state] legislation . ..be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions,

both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed"82 and
that the fourteenth amendment "was designed to prevent any person
or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for
discriminating and hostile legislation."8 "
Thus it would seem obvious that the passage of new legislation
or continued enforcement of an old law effect the same result on a
group of people within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
It seems contradictory to say that the remedy for denial of equality
in voting power is the assertion of a diluted voting power in the next
election. It may be admitted that mere failure to reapportion election
districts is non-justiciable. Nevertheless the enforcement of an
outdated, unfair act should be subject to review for it clearly deprives the person affected of equal protection under the law. A
thorough, straightforward look at the situation was presented by
Judge McLaughlin:
The time has come, and the Supreme Court has marked
the way, when serious consideration should be given to a
reversal of traditional reluctance of judicial intervention in
legislative reapportionment. The whole thrust of today's
legal climate is to end unconstitutional discrimination. It is
ludicrous to preclude judicial relief when a mainspring of
representative government is impaired. Legislators have no
immunity from the Constitution. The legislatures of our
land should be made as responsive to the Constitution of
the United States as are the citizens who elect the legis34

lators.

8'Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 299, 302 (1939).
°238 U.S. 383 (1915).
81313 U.S. 299 (1941).
82Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1886).
"Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188 (1888).
,Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 236 (Hawaii 1956).
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The ills effectuated by the refusal of state legislatures to apportion when justice demands it are very similar to the ills which have
been repeatedly redressed by the courts in the individual rights
cases. It is possible that the Court has at last started to consider
gerrymander cases in the light of the individual right decisions.
It is submitted that the Gomillion case may well mean that the
Court has decided that justice demands the granting of equitable
remedies in these instances. 35
JOSEPH S. FRIEDBERG

Insurance-Burden of Proof in Insurance Exception ClausesPleading
In Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co.,1 the plaintiff was injured while
riding in the automobile of the insured. Eight months after the
accident, the insured gave notice to the insurance company. The
insurer denied liability under the policy due to the insured's failure
to comply with a policy requirement for notification of loss within
a reasonable time. The policy designated compliance with this requirement as a condition precedent to recovery. The plaintiff sued
the insured and received a default judgment. The insurer knew
of this suit but was not a party thereto. In the suit by the plaintiff
against the insurer, the trial court instructed the jury that the
burden of proof was on the insurer to show that notice had not been
given within a reasonable time. This instruction was held error
on appeal, the court holding that the notice requirement was a condition precedent to recovery by the insured, thereby placing the
burden of proof of compliance with this requirement on the plaintiff.2
In reaching this result, the court distinguished the present case
from MacClure v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co.,. which indicated that
noncompliance with a cooperation requirement in an insurance
"' If the result of a judicial order enjoining the further operation of an
archaic electoral district would be slight disorganization by the use of an
"at large" electoral system in the next election, it must be answered that
necessity will soon generate a newer, fairer and more workable system.
t253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960).
In Muncie the plaintiff was the insured's judgment creditor. The court
stated that as such he could have no greater right to recover from the insurer
than the insured himself would have. Id. at 81, 116 S.E.2d at 479.
8229 N.C. 305, 49 S.E.2d 742 (1948).

